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Abstract—Program obfuscation is an important software pro-
tection technique that prevents attackers from revealing the
programming logic and design of the software. We introduce
translingual obfuscation, a new software obfuscation scheme
which makes programs obscure by “misusing” the unique
features of certain programming languages. Translingual ob-
fuscation translates part of a program from its original lan-
guage to another language which has a different program-
ming paradigm and execution model, thus increasing program
complexity and impeding reverse engineering. In this paper,
we investigate the feasibility and effectiveness of translingual
obfuscation with Prolog, a logic programming language. We
implement translingual obfuscation in a tool called BABEL,
which can selectively translate C functions into Prolog pred-
icates. By leveraging two important features of the Prolog
language, i.e., unification and backtracking, BABEL obfuscates
both the data layout and control flow of C programs, making
them much more difficult to reverse engineer. Our experiments
show that BABEL provides effective and stealthy software
obfuscation, while the cost is only modest compared to one of
the most popular commercial obfuscators on the market. With
BABEL, we verified the feasibility of translingual obfuscation,
which we consider to be a promising new direction for software
obfuscation.
1. Introduction
Obfuscation is an important technique for software pro-
tection, especially for preventing reverse engineering from
infringing software intellectual property. Generally speak-
ing, obfuscation is a semantics-preserving program transfor-
mation that aims to make a program more difficult to under-
stand and reverse engineer. The idea of using obfuscating
transformations to prevent reverse engineering can be traced
back to Collberg et al. [20], [21], [56]. Since then many
obfuscation methods have been proposed [46], [55], [58],
[65], [19], [79]. Malware authors also heavily rely on ob-
fuscation to compress or encrypt executable binaries so that
their products can avoid malicious content detection [69],
[67].
This is an extended version of a paper to appear in Proceedings of the
1st IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (Euro S&P 2016)
[73].
Currently the state-of-the-art obfuscation technique is to
incorporate with process-level virtualization. For example,
obfuscators such as VMProtect [10] and Code Virtualizer [4]
replace the original binary code with new bytecode, and a
custom interpreter is attached to interpret and execute the
bytecode. The result is that the original binary code does
not exist anymore, leaving only the bytecode and interpreter,
making it difficult to directly reverse engineer [39]. How-
ever, recent work has shown that the decode-and-dispatch
execution pattern of virtualization-based obfuscation can
be a severe vulnerability leading to effective deobfusca-
tion [24], [66], implying that we are in need of obfuscation
techniques based on new schemes.
We propose a novel and practical obfuscation method
called translingual obfuscation, which possesses strong se-
curity strength and good stealth, with only modest cost. The
key idea is that instead of inventing brand new obfuscation
techniques, we can exploit some existing programming lan-
guages for their unique design and implementation features
to achieve obfuscation effects. In general, programming
language features are rarely proposed or developed for
obfuscation purposes; however, some of them indeed make
reverse engineering much more challenging at the binary
level and thus can be “misused” for software protection.
In particular, some programming languages are designed
with unique paradigms and have very complicated execution
models. To make use of these language features, we can
translate a program written in a certain language to another
language which is more “confusing”, in the sense that it
consists of features leading to obfuscation effects.
In this paper, we obfuscate C programs by translat-
ing them into Prolog, presenting a feasible example of
the translingual obfuscation scheme. C is a traditional im-
perative programming language while Prolog is a typical
logic programming language. The Prolog language has some
prominent features that provide strong obfuscation effects.
Programs written in Prolog are executed in a search-and-
backtrack computation model which is dramatically dif-
ferent from the execution model of C and much more
complicated. Therefore, translating C code to Prolog leads
to obfuscated data layouts and control flows. Especially, the
complexity of Prolog’s execution model manifests mostly
in the binary form of the programs, making Prolog very
suitable for software protection.
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Translating one language to another is usually very
difficult, especially when the target and source languages
have different programming paradigms. However, we made
an important observation that for obfuscation purposes, lan-
guage translation could be conducted in a special manner.
Instead of developing a “clean” translation from C to Pro-
log, we propose an “obfuscating” translation scheme which
retains part of the C memory model, in some sense making
two execution models mixed together. We believe this im-
proves the obfuscating effect in a way that no obfuscation
methods have achieved before, to the best of our knowledge.
Consequently in translingual obfuscation, the obfuscation
does not only come from the obfuscating features of the
target language, but also from the translation itself. With this
new translation scheme we manage to kill two birds with one
stone, i.e., solving the technical problems in implementing
translingual obfuscation and strengthening the obfuscation
simultaneously.
There may be of a concern that obfuscation techniques
without solid theoretical foundations will not withstand re-
verse engineering attacks in the long run. However, research
on fundamental obfuscation theories, despite promising pro-
cess made recently [47], [35], [63], [15], [13], is still not
mature enough to spawn practical protection techniques.
There is a widely accepted consensus that no software pro-
tection scheme is resilient to skilled attackers if they inspect
the software with intensive effort [22]. A recently proved
theorem [14] partially supporting this claim states that, a
“universally effective” obfuscator does not exist, i.e., for
any obfuscation algorithm, there always exists an program
that it cannot effectively obfuscate. Given the situation, it
seems that developing an obfuscation scheme resilient to
all reverse engineering threats (known or unknown) is too
ambitious at this point. Hence, making reverse engineering
more difficult (but not impossible) could be a more realistic
goal to pursue.
We have implemented translingual obfuscation in a tool
called BABEL. BABEL can selectively transform a C func-
tion into semantically equivalent Prolog code and compile
code of both languages together into the executable form.
Our experiment results show that translingual obfuscation
is obscure and stealthy. The execution overhead of BABEL
is modest compared to a commercial obfuscator. We also
show that translingual obfuscation is resilient to one of the
most popular reverse engineering techniques.
In summary, we make the following contributions in this
research:
• We propose a new obfuscation method, namely
translingual obfuscation. Translingual obfuscation is
novel because it exploits exotic language features
instead of ad-hoc program transformations to pro-
tect programs against reverse engineering. Our new
method has a number of advantages over existing
obfuscation techniques, which will be discussed in
depth later.
• We implement translingual obfuscation in a tool
called BABEL which translates C to Prolog at the
scale of subroutines, i.e., from C functions to Prolog
predicates, to obfuscate the original programs. Lan-
guage translation is always a challenging problem,
especially when the target language has a heteroge-
neous execution model.
• We evaluate BABEL with respect to all four eval-
uation criteria proposed by Collberg et al. [21]:
potency, resilience, cost, and stealth, on a set of real-
world C programs with quite a bit of complexity and
diversity. Our experiments demonstrate that BABEL
provides strong protection against reverse engineer-
ing with only modest cost.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §2
defines our threat model. §3 provides a high-level view
on the insights and features of our translingual obfuscation
technique. §4 explains in detail why the Prolog programming
language can be misused for obfuscation. We summarize
the technical challenges in implementing translingual ob-
fuscation in §5. §6 and §7 present our C-to-Prolog trans-
lation method and the implementation details of BABEL,
respectively. We evaluate BABEL’s performance in §8. §9
has a discussion on some important topics about translingual
obfuscation, followed by the summary of related work in
§10. §11 concludes the paper.
2. Threat Model
For attackers who try to reverse engineer a program pro-
tected by obfuscation, we assume that they have full access
to the binary form of the program. They can examine the
static form of the binaries with whatever method available
to them. They can also execute the victim binaries in a
monitored environment with arbitrary input, thus can read
any data that has lived in the memory.
Do note that although we assume attackers have un-
limited access to program binaries, they should not posses
any knowledge about the source code in our threat model.
Assuming attackers can only examine the obfuscated pro-
gram at the binary level is important, because that would
mean any implementation detail of the language used in
translingual obfuscation contributes to the effectiveness of
obfuscation. As for the particular case of employing Prolog
in translingual obfuscation, since Prolog is a declarative
programming language, there is a much deeper semantic gap
between its source code and binaries, which is highlighted
as one of the major sources of translingual obfuscation’s
protection effects.
Finally, we explicitly clarify that in this work, attackers
are assumed to try to reveal the logical structure of the bina-
ries so that they can reproduce the algorithms by themselves.
In practice there are different levels of reverse engineer-
ing objectives. Sometimes understanding what a program
achieves is sufficient for attackers to fulfill their goals, but
in our case attackers need a more thorough understanding
on the semantics of the victim binaries.
Our threat model may seem too coarsely defined. How-
ever, we believe it is quite realistic, since reverse engineering
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Figure 1. Translingual obfuscation is a new protection layer complementary
to existing obfuscation methods, pushing the frontier forward in the battle
with reverse engineering.
could be a very ad-hoc process in practice. Actually, lack
of specifications makes it difficult for us to design and eval-
uate a new obfuscation technique in a fully comprehensive
manner, because we cannot make further assumptions on the
methods or tools that attackers may make use of. Therefore,
we hope that readers of this paper could pay more attention
to the general idea and picture we want to present.
3. Translingual Obfuscation
3.1. Overview
The basic idea of translingual obfuscation is that some
programming languages are more difficult to reverse en-
gineer than others. Intuitively, C is relatively easy to re-
verse engineer because binary code compiled from C pro-
grams shares the same imperative execution model with the
source code. For some programming languages like Prolog,
however, there is a much deeper gap between the source
code and the resulting binaries, since these languages have
fundamentally different abstractions from the imperative
execution model of the underlying hardware. Starting from
this insight, we analyze and evaluate the features of a foreign
programming language from the perspective of software pro-
tection. We also develop the translation technique that trans-
forms the original language to the obfuscating language.
Only with these efforts devoted, translingual obfuscation can
be a practical software protection scheme.
We view translingual obfuscation as a new layer of
software protection in the obfuscation-deobfuscation arms
race, as shown in Fig. 1. Different from previous obfuscation
methods which either work at the binary level or perform
same-language source-to-source transformations, translin-
gual obfuscation translates one language to another. There-
fore, translingual obfuscation can be applied after source-
code obfuscation and before binary obfuscation without
affecting the applicability of existing obfuscation methods.
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Figure 2. Comparing translingual obfuscation and virtualization-based ob-
fuscation.
3.2. Comparing with Virtualization-Based Obfus-
cation
The virtualization-based obfuscation is currently the
state of the art in binary obfuscation. Some features of
translingual obfuscation resemble the idea of virtualization-
based obfuscation, but we want to emphasize a signifi-
cant difference here. Currently, most implementations of
virtualization-based obfuscation tend to encode original
native machine code with a RISC-like virtual instruction
set and interpret the encoded binary in a decode-dispatch
pattern [68], [60], [37], which has been identified as a
notable weakness of security and can be exploited by various
attacks [66], [24], [81]. Translingual obfuscation, however,
gets most of its security strength by intentionally relying on
obfuscation-contributing language features that comes from
a heterogeneous programming model. Essentially, translin-
gual obfuscation does not have to re-encode the original
binary as long as the foreign language employed supports
compilation into native code. Fig. 2 shows the relationship
and key differences between the two methods. Our translin-
gual obfuscation implementation BABEL and virtualization-
based obfuscation do not overlap.
3.3. Benefits
Translingual obfuscation can provide benefits that cannot
be delivered by any single obfuscation method developed
before, to the best of our knowledge:
• Translingual obfuscation provides strong obfusca-
tion strength and more obfuscation variety by intro-
ducing a different programming paradigm. If there
exists a universally effective and automated method
to nullify the obfuscation effects, namely the addi-
tional program complexity, introduced by a program-
ming language’s execution model, that would mean
it is possible to significantly simplify the design
and implementation of that language, which is very
unlikely for mature languages.
• Translingual obfuscation can be very stealthy,
because programming with multiple languages
is a completely legit practice. Compared with
virtualization-based obfuscation which encodes na-
tive code into bytecode that has an exotic encoding
format, translingual obfuscation introduces neither
abnormal byte entropy nor deviant instruction dis-
tributions.
• Translingual obfuscation is not just a single ob-
fuscation algorithm but a general framework. Al-
though we particularly utilizes Prolog in this paper,
there are other languages that can be misused for
translingual obfuscation. For example, the New Jer-
sey implementation of ML (SML/NJ) [11] does not
even include a runtime stack. Instead, it allocates
all frames and closures on a garbage-collected heap,
potentially making program analysis much more dif-
ficult. Another example is Haskell, a pure functional
language featuring lazy evaluation [45] which can
be implemented with a unique execution model that
greatly differs from the traditional imperative com-
putation [50].
All these benefits make us believe that translingual obfus-
cation could be a new direction in software protection.
4. Misusing Prolog for Obfuscation
In this section we briefly introduce the Prolog program-
ming language and explain why we can misuse its language
features for obfuscation.
4.1. Prolog Basics
The basic building blocks of Prolog are terms. Both
a Prolog program itself and the data it manipulates are
built from terms. There are three kinds of terms: constants,
variables, and structures. A constant is either a number
(integer or real) or an atom. An atom is a general-purpose
name, which is similar to a constant string entity in other
languages. A structure term is of the form f(t1, · · · , tn),
where f is a symbol called a functor and t1, · · · , tn are
subterms. The number of subterms a functor takes is called
its arity. It is allowed to use a symbol with different arities,
so the notation ‘f/n’ is used when referring to a structure
term f with n subterms.
Structure terms become clauses when assigned seman-
tics. A clause can be a fact, a rule, or a query. A predefined
clause is a fact if it has an empty body, otherwise it is a rule.
For example, “parent(jack,bill).” is a fact, which
could mean that “jack is a parent of bill.” One the other
hand, a rule can be like the following line of code:
grandparent(G,C):-parent(G,P),parent(P,C).
This rule can be written as the following formula in the
first-order logic:
∀G,C, P.grandparent(G,C)← parent(G,P ) ∧ parent(P,C)
STR f/4
REF
REF
INT 1
REF
REF
STR g/1
FLT 3.2
Meaning of the tags
REF: reference (variable)
STR: structure
INT: integer
FLT: floating point
Figure 3. An example memory representation of term
f(X,Y,1,g(3.2)) in Prolog, where both X and Y are unified
with another variable which itself is un-unified.
Clauses with the same name and the same number of
arguments define a relation, namely a predicate. With facts
and rules defined, programmers can issue queries, which
are formulas for the Prolog resolution system to solve. In
accordance with our previous examples, a query could be
grandparent(G,bill) which is basically asking “who
are bill’s grandparents?”
A Prolog program is a set of terms. The Prolog resolu-
tion engine maintains an internal database of terms through-
out program execution, trying to resolve queries with facts
and rules by logical inference. Essentially, computation in
Prolog is reduced to a searching problem. This is differ-
ent from the commonly seen Turing machine computation
model but the theoretical foundation of logic programming
guarantees that Prolog is Turing complete [70].
4.2. Obfuscation-Contributing Features
4.2.1. Unification. One of the core concepts in automated
logic resolution, hence in logic programming, is unification.
Essentially it is a pattern-matching technique. Two first-
order terms t1 and t2 can be unified if there exists a
substitution σ making them identical, i.e., tσ1 = t
σ
2 . For
example, two terms k(s(g), Y ) and k(X, t(k)) are unified
when X is substituted by s(g) and Y is substituted by t(k).
Unification is one of the basises of Prolog’s computation
model. We show this by example. The following clause
defines a simple “increment-by-one” procedure:
inc(Input,Output):-Output is Input+1.
Now for a query inc(1,R), the Prolog resolu-
tion engine will first try to unify inc(1,R) with
inc(Input,Output), which means Input should be
unified with 1 and Output should be unified with R. Once
this unification succeeds, the original query is reduced to
a subgoal Output is Input+1. Since Input is now
unified with 1, Input+1 is evaluated as 2. Finally Output
gets unified with 2 (is/2 is the evaluate-and-unify operator
predicate), making R unified with 2 as well.
To support unification, Prolog implements terms as ver-
tices in directed acyclic graphs. Each term is represented by
a <tag,content> tuple, where tag indicates whether
the type of the term and content is either the value
of a constant or the address of the term the variable is
unified with. Fig. 3 is an example showing how Prolog may
represent a term in memory [12].
Unification makes data shapes in Prolog program mem-
ory dramatically different from C and much more ob-
scure. The graph-like implementation of unification poses
great challenges to binary data shape analyses which aim
to recover high-level data structures from binary program
images [40], [36], [62], [25]. Even if some of the graph
structures can be identified, there is still a gap between
this low-level representation and the logical organization of
original data, which harshly tests attackers’ reverse engineer-
ing abilities. Unification also complicates data access. To
retrieve the true value of a variable, the Prolog engine has to
iterate the entire unification list. It is well known that static
analysis is weak against loops and indirect memory access.
Also, the tags in the term tuples are encoded as bit fields,
meaning that bit-level analysis algorithms are required to
reveal the semantics of a binary compiled from Prolog
code. However, achieving bit-level precision is another great
technical challenge for both static and dynamic program
analyses, mainly because of scalability issues [64], [42],
[29], [80].
4.2.2. Backtracking. Different from Prolog unification
which mainly obfuscates program data, the backtracking
feature obfuscates the control flow. Backtracking is part of
the resolution mechanism in Prolog. As explained earlier,
finding a solution for a resolvable formula is essentially
searching for a proper unifier, namely a substitution, so that
the substituted formula can be expanded to consist of only
facts and other formulas known to be true. Since there may
be more than one solution for a unification problem instance,
it is possible that the resolution process will unify two
terms in the way that it makes resolving the formula later
unfeasible. As a consequence, Prolog needs a mechanism
to roll back from an incorrect proof path, which is called
backtracking.
To make backtracking possible, Prolog saves the pro-
gram state before taking one of the search branches. This
saved state is called a “choice-point” by Prolog and is sim-
ilar to the concept of “continuation” in functional program-
ming. When searching along one path fails, the resolution
engine will restore the latest choice-point and continue to
search through one of the untried branches.
This search-and-backtrack execution model leads to a
totally different control flow scheme in Prolog programs
at the low level, compared to programs in the same logic
written by C. Fig. 4 is an example where a C function
is transformed into a Prolog clause by our tool BABEL
(with manual edits to make the code more readable), along
with the program execution flows before and after BABEL
transformation. The real control flow of the Prolog version
of the function is much more complicated than presented,
and we have greatly simplified the flow chart for readability.
In the Prolog part of Fig. 4, a choice point is created right
after the execution flow enters the predicate pfoo which
is a disjunction of two subclauses. The Prolog resolution
routine will first try to satisfy the first subclause. If it fails,
the engine will backtrack to the last choice-point and try the
second subclause.
Due to the complicated backtracking model, a large
portion of control flow transfers in Prolog are indirect. The
implementation of backtracking also involves techniques
such as long jump and stack unwinding. Clearly, Prolog has
a much more obscure low-level execution model compared
to C, and imperative programming in general, from the per-
spective of static analysis. Different from some other control
flow obfuscation techniques that inject fake control flows
which are never feasible at run time, Prolog’s backtracking
actually happens during program execution, making translin-
gual obfuscation also resilient to dynamic analysis. Most
importantly, after the C-to-Prolog translation the original
C control flows are reformed with a completely different
programming paradigm, which is fundamentally different
from existing control-flow based obfuscation techniques.
5. Technical Challenges
To make use of Prolog’s execution model for obfuscating
C programs, we need a translation technique to forge the
Prolog counterpart of a C function. At this point, there are
various challenges to resolve.
5.1. Control Flow
As an imperative programming language, C provides
much flexibility of crafting program control flows almost
with language key words such as continue, break, and
return. Prolog programs, however, have to follow the general
evaluation procedure of logical formulas, which inherently
forbids some “fancy” control flows allowed by C.
5.2. Memory Model
In C programming, many low-level details are not
opaque to programmers. As for memory manipulation, C
programmers can access almost arbitrary memory locations
via pointers. Prolog lacks the semantics to express direct
memory access. Moreover, the C memory model is closely
coupled with other sub-structures of the language, e.g., the
type system. C types are not only logical abstractions but are
also implications on low-level memory layouts of the data.
For instance, logically adjacent elements in a C array and
fields in a C struct are also physically adjacent in memory.
Therefore, some logical operations on C data structures
can be implemented as direct memory accesses which are
semantically equivalent only with the C memory modeling.
Below is an example.
struct ty {
int a;
int b;
} s[2];
/* Equivalent to s[0].a=s[0].b=s[1].a=0;
* with many compilers and architectures */
memset((void*)s, 0, 3*sizeof(int));
Translating the code snippet above into pure Prolog could
be difficult because the translator will have to infer the logic
effects of the memset statement.
int foo(int sel,
int x, int y)
{
int ret;
if(sel==1)
ret=x;
else
ret=y;
return ret;
}
foo(sel,x,y)
if(sel == 1)
ret = x ret = y
return ret
true false
pfoo(Sel,X,Y,R) :-
(Sel =:= 1 ->
R is X);
(R is Y).
pfoo(Sel,X,Y,R) Sel =:= 1
Unification:
R is X
Next Clause
Resolution
Failure Handler
Unification:
R is Y
Fail
true
fail
false
succeed
succeed
fail
Figure 4. Different control flows of C and Prolog binaries implementing the same algorithm, due to different execution models. In the Prolog graph, dashed
lines indicate indirect jumps and arrows with the same pattern indicate feasible paths through the resolution failure handler. Both control flow graphs are
summarized from post-compilation binaries.
5.3. Type Casting
C type casting is of full flexibility in the sense that a C
programmer can cast any type to any other type, no matter
the conversion makes sense or not. This can be realized by
violating the load-store consistency, namely storing a vari-
able of some type into a memory location and later loading
the content of the same chunk of memory into a variable of
another type. The C union type is a high-level support for
type castings that breaks the load-store consistency, but C
programmers can choose to use pointers to directly achieve
the same effect. Imitating this type casting system could be
a notable challenge for other languages.
6. C-to-Prolog Translation
This section explains how we address the challenges
mentioned in the previous section. Considering the many
obstacles for developing a complete translation from C to
Prolog, we do not seek to obtain a pure Prolog version of the
original C program. The section explains how we address
the challenges mentioned in the previous section and how
we develop a partial C-to-Prolog translation method, which
is suitable for translingual obfuscation.
6.1. Control Flow Regularization
There has been a large amount of research on refining
C program control flows, especially on eliminating goto
statements [43], [59], [76]. For now, we consider that goto
elimination is a solved problem and assume the C programs
to be protected do not contain goto statements. Given a
C function without goto statements, there are two control
flow patterns that cannot be directly adopted by Prolog
programming, i.e., control flow cuts and loops. We call these
patterns irregular control flows.
6.1.1. Control Flow Cuts. Control flow cuts refer to the
termination of control flows in the middle of a C function,
for example:
int foo (int m, int n) {
if(m)
return n; // Flow of if branch ends
else
n=n+1;
n=n+2;
return n; // Flow of else branch ends
}
The C language grants programmers much freedom
in building control flows, even without using goto state-
ments. In Prolog, however, control flows have to be routed
based on the short-circuit rules in evaluating logical ex-
pressions. With short-circuit effects, parallel statements
can be connected by disjunction and sequential statements
can be connected by conjunction. To show why the con-
trol flow pattern in the C code above cannot be imple-
mented by only adopting short-circuit rules, consider a
C function with body {if(e) {a;} else {b;} c;}.
Naturally, it should be translated into a Prolog sentence
(((e->a);b),c), where -> denotes implication, ; de-
notes disjunction, and , denotes conjunction. However, this
translation is not semantics-preserving when a is a return
statement, because if the clause a is evaluated, at least one
of b and c has to be evaluated to decide the truth of the
whole logic formula.
We fix control flow cuts by replicating and/or reorder-
ing basic blocks syntactically subsequent to the cuts. For
example, we rewrite the previously shown C function into
the following structure:
int foo (int m, int n) {
if(m)
return n;
else {
n=n+1;
{ n=n+2; return n; }
}
}
After the revision, the C code is naturally translated into
a new Prolog clause (e->a);(b,c), which is consistent
with the original C semantics.
6.1.2. Loops. Most loops cannot be directly implemented
in Prolog. The fundamental reason is that Prolog does not
allow unifying a variable more than once. We can address
this problem by transforming loops into recursive functions,
but in-loop irregular control flows complicate the situation.
The irregularity comes from the use of keywords “continue”
and “return.” A continue statement cuts the control flow in
the middle of a loop, bringing up a problem similar to the
aforementioned asymmetric returns in functions. As such,
irregular control flows resulting from continue statements
can be regularized in the same way, i.e., replicating and/or
reordering basic blocks syntactically subsequent to continue
statements.
Like a continue statement, a return statement also cuts
the control flow in a loop, but its impact reaches outside
because it cuts the control flow of the function enclosing the
loop. Hence, a recursive Prolog predicate transformed from
a loop needs an extra argument to carry a flag indicating
whether an in-loop return has occurred.
6.2. C Memory Model Simulation
As stated in §5, the C memory model is closely coupled
with other parts of the language and it is hard to separate
them. However, translingual obfuscation keeps the original
C memory model, making preserving semantic equivalence
much easier. In our design, the Prolog runtime is embedded
in the C execution environment, so it is possible for Pro-
log code to directly operate memories within a program’s
address space.
The way we handle C memory simulation illustrates the
advantage of developing language translations for obfus-
cation purposes. Unlike tools seeking complete translation
from C to other languages, translingual obfuscation does not
have to mimic C memory completely with target language
features (e.g., converting C pointers to Java references [26]),
meaning we can reduce translation complexity and circum-
vent various limitations. That being said, partially imitating
the C memory model in Prolog is still a non-trivial task.
6.2.1. Supporting C Memory-Access Operators. The first
step to simulating the C memory model is to support pointer
operations. We introduce the following new clauses into our
target Prolog language:
rdPtrInt(+Ptr, +Size, -Content)
wrPtrInt(+Ptr, +Size, +Content)
rdPtrFloat(+Ptr, +Size, -Content)
wrPtrFloat(+Ptr, +Size, +Content)
These clauses are implemented in C. rdPtrInt/3 and
rdPtrFloat/3 allow us to load the content of a mem-
ory cell (address and size indicated by Ptr and Size,
respectively) into a Prolog variable Content. Similarly,
wrPtrInt/3 and wrPtrFloat/3 can write the content
of a Prolog variable into a memory cell. These four clauses
simulate the behaviors of the “pointer dereference” operator
(*) in C.
In addition to read-from-pointer and write-to-pointer op-
erations, C also has the “address-of” operator which takes an
lvalue, i.e., an expression that is allocated a storage location,
as the operand and returns its associated storage location,
namely address. There is no need to explicitly support this
operator in Prolog because the address of any lvalue in C
has a static representation which is known by the compiler.1
We can obtain the results of “address-of” operations in
the C environment and pass those values into the Prolog
environment as arguments.
We also handle several C syntax sugers related to mem-
ory access: “subscript” ([]) and “field-of” (. and ->).
We convert these operators into equivalent combinations
of pointer arithmetic and dereference so that we do not
need to coin their counterparts in Prolog. This conversion
requires assumptions on compiler implementation and target
architecture to calculate type sizes and field displacements.
6.2.2. Maintaining Consistency. It is a natural scheme that
a C-to-Prolog translation maps every C variable to a cor-
responding Prolog variable. Prolog does not allow variable
update, but we can overcome this restriction by transforming
C code into a form close to static single assignment (SSA),
in which variables are only initialized at one program lo-
cation and never updated. In the strict SSA form, variables
can only be statically initialized once even if the scopes are
disjoint. Prolog does not require this because the language
checks re-unification at run time, meaning variables can be
updated in exclusively executed parts of the program, e.g.,
the “then” and “else” branches of the same if statement.
Therefore, we do not need to implement the φ function in
our SSA transformation.
The SSA transformation can be implemented by renam-
ing variables. The challenging part is that simply renaming
variables in the original C code could break program seman-
tics because of side effects caused by memory operations,
i.e., variable contents can be accessed without referring to
variable names. This is the consistency problem we have
discussed earlier. Fig. 5 shows an instance of the problem.
To address this issue, we keep the addresses of local
variables and parameters if they are possibly accessed via
pointers. Then we flush variable contents back to the mem-
ory before a read-from-pointer operation and reload variable
contents from the memory after a write-to-pointer operation.
Inter-procedural pointer dereferences are also taken into ac-
count. When callee functions accept pointers as arguments,
we do variable flush before function calls and do variable
reload after. The flush makes sure that changes made by
Prolog code are committed to the underlying C memory
before they are read again. Similarly, the reload assures
that values unified with Prolog logical variables are always
consistent with the content in C memory. We perform a
sound points-to analysis to compute the set of variables that
need to be reloaded or flushed at each program point. After
inserting the flush and reload operations, the SSA variable
renaming no longer breaks the original program semantics.
Fig. 6 illustrates our solution based on the example in Fig. 5.
1. For example, a local variable is usually allocated on the stack and the
compiler will have a static expression of its address. On x86, the expression
is likely to be $offset(%ebp) or $offset(%esp), where $offset
is a constant. Compilers can also decide how to statically represent the
addresses of global variables.
a=0;
p=&a;// p points to a
a=1; // a gets 1
b=*p;// b gets a(1)
c=0;
p=&c;
c=1; // c gets 1
*p=3;// c gets 3
d=c; // d gets c(3)
(a) Original
a1=0;
p1=&a1;// p1 points to a1
a2=1; // a2 gets 1
b1=*p1;// b1 gets a1(0)
c1=0;
p2=&c1;// p2 points to c1
c2=1; // c2 gets 1
*p2=3; // c1 gets 3
d1=c2; // d1 gets c2(1)
(b) Renamed
Figure 5. Memory operations affecting the correctness of C source code
SSA renaming.
a=0;
p=&a;
a=1;
b=*p;
c=0;
p=&c;
c=1;
*p=3;
d=c;
(a) Orig.
pa=&a;
pc=&c;
a=0;
p=&a;
a=1;
*pa=a;// Flush
b=*p;
c=0;
p=&c;
c=1;
*p=3;
c=*pc;// Reload
d=c;
(b) With flush and reload
pa=&a1;// const pointer
pc=&c1;// const pointer
a1=0;
p1=&a1;
a2=1; // a2 gets 1
*pa=a2;// a1 gets a2(1)
b1=*p1;// b1 gets a1(1)
c1=0;
p2=&c1;
c2=1;
*p2=3; // c1 gets 3
c3=*pc;// c3 gets c1(3)
d1=c3; // d1 gets c3(3)
(c) Renamed with flush and reload
Figure 6. Semantic-preserving SSA renaming on C source code with the
presence of pointer operations.
6.3. Supporting Other C Features
6.3.1. Struct, Union, and Array. In §5, we showed that
C data types like struct and array can be manipulated via
memory access. Since we have already built support for
the C memory model in Prolog, the original challenge now
becomes a shortcut to supporting C struct, union, and array.
We simply transform the original C code and implement all
operations on structs, unions, and arrays through pointers.
After this transformation the primitive data types provided
by Prolog are enough to represent any C data structure.
6.3.2. Type Casting. With our C memory simulation
method, supporting type castings performed via pointers
does not require additional effort, even if they may violate
the load-store consistency. As for explicit castings, e.g., from
integers to floating points, we utilize the built-in Prolog type
casting clauses like float/1.
6.3.3. External and Indirect Function Call. Since the
source code of library functions is usually unavailable,
translating them into Prolog is not an option. In general,
translations of translingual obfuscation can support external
subroutine invocation with the help of foreign language
interfaces. As for C+Prolog obfuscation, most Prolog im-
plementations provide the interface for calling C functions
from a Prolog context. The same interface can also be used
to invoke functions via pointers.
6.4. Obfuscating Translation
Our translation scheme fully exploits the obfuscation-
contributing features introduced in §4.2, generally because:
• The conversion from C data structures to Prolog
data structures happens by default, and every C
assignment is translated to Prolog unification.
• Intra-procedural control-flow transfers originally
coded in C are now implemented by Prolog’s back-
tracking mechanism. This significantly complicates
the low-level logic of the resulting binaries.
Especially, we would like to highlight the method we
use to support the C memory model in Prolog. At the
high level, the original C memory layout is kept after the
translation. However, the behavior of the C-part memory
becomes much different from the original program. To
maintain the consistency between the C-side memory and
Prolog-side memory, we introduce the flush-reload method
which disturbs the sequence of memory access. In this way,
the memory footprint of the obfuscated program is no longer
what it was during program execution.
We believe our translation method is one of the fac-
tors that make translingual obfuscation resilient to both
semantics-based and syntax-based binary diffing, as will be
shown in §8.2.
7. Implementation of BABEL
BABEL is our translingual obfuscation prototype. The
workflow of BABEL has three steps: C code preprocess-
ing, C-to-Prolog translation, and C+Prolog compilation. The
preprocessing step reforms the original C source code so
that the processed program becomes suitable for line-by-line
translation to Prolog. The second step translates C functions
to Prolog predicates. In the last step, BABEL combines C
and Prolog code together with a carefully designed interface.
We choose GNU Prolog [27] as the Prolog implementa-
tion to employ in BABEL. Like many other Prolog systems,
GNU Prolog compiles Prolog source into the “standard”
Warren Abstract Machine (WAM) [75] instructions. What
is desirable to us is that GNU Prolog can further compile
WAM code into native code. This feature makes BABEL
more distinguishable from virtualization-based obfuscation
tools which compile the original program to bytecode and
execute it with a custom virtual machine.
7.1. Preprocessing and Translating C to Prolog
Before actually translating C to Prolog, we need to
preprocess the C code first. The preprocessing includes the
following steps, which is done with the help of the CIL
library [57].
1) Simplify C code into the three-address form with-
out switch statements and ternary conditional ex-
pressions.
2) Convert loops to tail-recursive functions.
3) Eliminate control flow cuts.
4) Transform operations on global, struct, union, and
array variables into pointer operations.
5) Perform variable flush and reload whenever neces-
sary.
6) Eliminate all memory operators except pointer
dereferences.
7) Rename variables so that the C code is in a form
close to SSA.
After preprocessing, we can translate C to Prolog line by
line. The translation rules are listed in Fig. 7. Note that by
the time we start translating C to Prolog, the preprocessed
C code does not contain any switch and loop statements,
because they are transformed into either nested if statements
or recursive functions. As discussed in §6.1, we do not
consider goto statements.
We take translating arithmetic and logical expressions
as a trivial task, but that leads to a limitation in our
translation. Due to the fact that Prolog does not subdivide
integer types, integer arithmetics in Prolog are not equiv-
alent to their C counterparts. For example, given two C
variables x and y of type int (4 bytes long) and their
addition x+y, the equivalent expression in Prolog should
be (X+Y)/\0xffffffff, assuming that X and Y are
the corresponding logical variables of x and y. Therefore,
if a C program intentionally relies on integer overflows
or underflows, there is a chance that our translation will
fail. However, fully emulating C semantics incurs significant
performance penalty.
Previous work on translating C to other languages faces
the same issue, and many of them chose to ignore it [18],
[52], [72]. The C-to-JavaScript converter Emscripten pro-
vides the option to fully emulate the C semantics [82]. It also
has a set of optional heuristics to infer program points where
full emulation is necessary, but that method is not guaranteed
to work correctly. We do not particularly take this issue into
account when implementing BABEL. However, we expect
BABEL’s translation to have a low failure chance thanks to
the employment of write-to-pointer operations in Prolog and
the variable flush-reload method. Since the write-to-pointer
operation specifies data sizes, the truncation automatically
takes place whenever an integer variable is flushed and
reloaded. In GNU Prolog on 64-bit platforms, all integers are
represented by 61-bit two’s complement (3 bits are occupied
by a WAM tag), which is large enough to hold most practical
integer and pointer2 values.
7.2. Combining C and Prolog
BABEL combines the C and Prolog runtime environ-
ments together, and the program starts from executing C
2. Most 64-bit CPUs only implement a 48-bit virtual address space.
code. When the execution encounters an obfuscated func-
tion (which is now a wrapper for initiating queries to the
corresponding Prolog predicate), it setups a context prior
to evaluating the Prolog predicate. In the setup process
the wrapper allocates local variables whose addresses are
referred to in the preprocessed C function. The wrapper then
passes the addresses along with function arguments to the
Prolog predicate through the C-to-Prolog interface provided
by GNU Prolog. Fig. 8 illustrates how the two languages
are combined.
7.3. Customizing Prolog Engine
Although GNU Prolog has some nice features that make
it a mostly adequate candidate for implementing BABEL, it
still does not fully satisfy our requirements, thus requiring
some customization. A notable issue about GNU Prolog is
that its interface for calling Prolog from C is not reentrant.
This is critical because by design, users of BABEL can freely
choose the functions they want to obfuscate. To support
this, it is in general not possible to avoid stack traces that
interleave C and Prolog subroutines. We found that the
non-reentrant issue results from the use of a global WAM
state across the whole GNU Prolog engine. We fixed it by
maintaining a stack to save the WAM state before a new
C-to-Prolog interface invocation and restore the state after
the call is finished.
Another issue is that GNU Prolog does not implement
garbage collection; therefore memory consumption can eas-
ily explode. This problem is not as severe as it looks because
we do not have to maintain a heap for Prolog runtime
throughout the lifetime of the program. Because we know
that the life cycles of all Prolog variables are bounded by
the scope of predicates, we can safely empty the Prolog
heap when there are no pending Prolog subroutines during
the execution. Since GNU Prolog implements the heap as a
large global array and indicates heap usage with a heap-top
pointer, we can empty the heap by simply resetting the heap-
top pointer to the starting point of the heap array, which is
very efficient.
8. Evaluation
Collberg et al. [21] proposed to evaluate an obfusca-
tion technique with respect to four dimensions: potency,
resilience, cost, and stealth. Potency measures how obscure
and complex the program has become after being obfus-
cated. Resilience indicates how well programs obfuscated
by BABEL can withstand reverse engineering effort, espe-
cially automated deobfuscation. Cost measures the execu-
tion overhead imposed by obfuscation. Stealth measures the
difficulty in detecting the existence of obfuscation, given
the obfuscated binaries. We evaluate BABEL and observe to
what extent it meets these four criteria.
To show that our tool can effectively protect real-world
software of different categories, we apply BABEL to six open
source C programs that have been widely deployed for years
Assignment (foo = e;)T → (Pfoo is eT )
Pointer arithmetic (p2 = p1 + intVal;)T | TypeOf(p1) = T* → (σ(p2) is σ(p1) + SizeOf(T) * σ(intVal))
Pointer dereference (foo = *p;)T | TypeOf(p) = T* → rdPtr(σ(foo), SizeOf(T), σ(p))
Write by pointer (*p = foo;)T | TypeOf(p) = T* → wrPtr(σ(p), SizeOf(T), σ(foo))
Empty Block ({})T → (true)
Non-empty Block ({s1 · · · sn})T → (sT1 , · · ·, sTn )
Conditional (if (e) {bthen} else {belse})T → (eT , {bthen}T ; {belse}T )
Function call (ret = fun(a1, · · ·, an);)T → predFun(σ(a1), · · ·, σ(an), σ(ret))
Indirect function call (ret = funptr(a1, · · ·, an);)T → predIndFun(σ(funptr), σ(a1), · · ·, σ(an), σ(ret))
Function return (return e;)T → (R is eT )
Function definition (fun(T1 a1, · · ·, Tn an) {bbody})T → predFun(σ(a1), · · ·, σ(an)) :- bTbody.
Figure 7. Definition of T , BABEL’s C-to-Prolog translation. e, s, b, and T denote C expressions, statements, blocks, and types, respectively. σ is the
bijective mapping from C identifiers to corresponding Prolog identifiers. R denotes the Prolog identifier used to hold the returned value in the translated
predicate. predFun can be either a real Prolog predicate or a wrapper of a foreign C function, depending on whether the target function is translated or
not. predIndFun is a wrapper for a special foreign C function which further calls into funptr with given arguments.
int main() {
...
}
int bar() {
...
x = foo(a);
...
y = foo(b);
...
}
int foo
(int arg) {
s1;
s2;
...
sn;
return ret;
}
Function To Be
Obfuscated
Original C Code Obfuscated Code (C + Prolog)
int main() {
...
}
int bar() {
...
x = foo(a);
...
y = foo(b);
...
}
int foo(int arg) {
Declare C Local Variables;
Initialize Prolog Arguments;
Start Prolog Query (foo_babel);
Read Prolog Return Value;
return ret;
}
foo_babel(Ret, Arg)
:- p1,
p2,
...,
pn.
C-to-Prolog Wrapper
Prolog Predicate
(translated from
the original foo)
Figure 8. The context for executing obfuscated code in BABEL.
or even decades. Among the six programs, four are CPU-
bound applications and the other two are IO-bound servers.
The CPU-bound applications include algebraic transfor-
mation (bzip2), integer computation (mcf), state machine
(regexp), and floating-point computation (svm light). The
two IO-bound servers cover two of the most popular net-
work protocols, i.e., FTP (oftpd) and HTTP (mongoose).
We believe that our selection is a representative evaluation
set covering a wide range of real-world software. Table 1
presents the details of these programs.3
We define the term obfuscation level as the percentage of
functions obfuscated in a C program. For example, an obfus-
cated bzip2 instance at the 20% obfuscation level is a bzip2
binary compiled from source code consisting of 80% of
the original functions in C and Prolog predicates translated
from the other 20% C functions by BABEL. We achieve all
obfuscation levels by randomly selecting candidates from all
functions that can be obfuscated by BABEL, but note that
this random selection scheme is just for avoiding subjective
picking in our research. In practice, BABEL users should
decide which functions are critical and in need of protection.
3. We notice that some previous work [19] on obfuscation employed
the SPEC benchmarks or GNU Coreutils, which are also widely used in
other research, for evaluation. Unfortunately, these two software suites use
very complicated build infrastructures. Since BABEL needs to compile C
and Prolog together, a specialized build procedure is required. Currently
our prototypical implementation of BABEL cannot automatically hook an
existing build system, so we are not able to include SPEC or GNU Coreutils
into our evaluation.
TABLE 1. PROGRAMS USED FOR BABEL EVALUATION.
Program Description LoC # of Func.
bzip2 Data compressor 8,117 108
mcf Vehicle scheduler 2,685 25
regexp Regular expression engine 1,391 22
svm light Support vector machine 7,101 103
oftpd Anonymous FTP server 5,211 96
mongoose Light-weight HTTP server 5,711 203
This is the same as popular commercial virtualization-based
obfuscation tools [4], [10].
In the evaluation, we compare BABEL with one of
the most popular commercial obfuscators, Code Virtual-
izer (CV) [4], which is virtualization based and has been
on the market since 2006. The comparison covers all the
four dimensions of evaluation, but some of the evaluation
methodologies we designed for BABEL may not be suitable
for evaluating Code Virtualizer. For those evaluations that
we consider not suitable for CV, we will explain the reasons
and readers should be cautious in interpreting the data.
8.1. Potency
We use two groups of static metrics to show how
much complexity BABEL has injected into the obfuscated
programs. The first group consists of basic statistics about
the call graph and control-flow graph (CFG), including
the number of edges in both graphs and the number of
TABLE 2. PROGRAM COMPLEXITY BEFORE AND AFTER BABEL OBFUSCATION AT 30% OBFUSCATION LEVEL
Program # of Call Graph Edges # of CFG Edges # of Basic Blocks Cyclomatic Number Knot CountOriginal BABEL Ratio Original BABEL Ratio Original BABEL Ratio Original BABEL Ratio Original BABEL Ratio
bzip2 353 5964 16.9 5382 19771 3.7 3528 17078 4.8 1856 2695 1.5 3120 12396 4.0
mcf 78 5449 69.9 854 14233 16.7 583 13086 22.4 273 1149 4.2 153 8792 57.5
regexp 72 5276 73.3 855 13290 15.5 591 11802 20.0 266 1490 5.6 1135 9530 8.4
svm 511 6739 13.2 5375 20752 3.9 3545 18533 5.2 1832 2221 1.2 2972 11521 3.9
oftpd 455 5810 12.8 2035 15501 7.6 1667 14422 8.7 370 1081 2.9 1277 9911 7.8
mongoose 1027 6762 6.6 2788 17115 6.1 2086 16079 7.7 704 1038 1.5 493 9491 19.3
Geom.Mean. 279.2 5972.7 21.4 2220.4 16555.5 7.5 1570.2 14987.8 9.5 633.0 1502.4 2.4 1002.3 10199.1 10.2
TABLE 3. PROGRAM COMPLEXITY BEFORE AND AFTER CODE VIRTUALIZER (CV) OBFUSCATION AT 30% OBFUSCATION LEVEL
Program # of Call Graph Edges # of CFG Edges # of Basic Blocks Cyclomatic Number Knot CountOriginal CV Ratio Original CV Ratio Original CV Ratio Original CV Ratio Original CV Ratio
bzip2 353 261 0.7 5382 3868 0.7 3528 2826 0.8 1856 1044 0.6 3120 713 0.2
mcf 78 34 0.4 854 461 0.5 583 329 0.6 273 134 0.5 153 68 0.4
regexp 72 66 0.9 855 525 0.6 591 377 0.6 266 150 0.6 1135 603 0.5
svm 511 357 0.7 5375 3267 0.6 3545 2358 0.7 1832 911 0.5 2972 302 0.1
oftpd 455 390 0.9 2035 1727 0.8 1667 1435 0.9 370 294 0.8 1277 542 0.4
mongoose 1027 585 0.6 2788 2063 0.7 2086 1638 0.8 704 427 0.6 493 442 0.9
Geom.Mean. 279.2 190.4 0.7 2220.4 1489.0 0.6 1570.2 1117.0 0.7 633.0 365.9 0.6 1002.3 358.3 0.3
basic blocks. These metrics have been used to evaluate
obfuscation techniques in related work [19].
In addition to basic statistics, we also calculate two
metrics used to quantify program complexity, proposed by
historical software engineering research. The measures are
the cyclomatic number [53] and the knot count [77]. Both
metrics reflect Gilb’s statement that logic complexity is a
measure of the degree of decision making within a sys-
tem [38]. They also have been considered for evaluating
obfuscation effects [21]. The cyclomatic number is defined
as e − n + 2 where e and n are the numbers of edges
and vertices in the CFG. Intuitively, the cyclomatic number
represents the amount of decision points in a program [23].
The knot count is the amount of edge crossings in the CFG
when all nodes are placed linearly and all edges are drawn
on the same side.
Table 2 shows the comparison between binaries with
and without BABEL obfuscation on the complexity mea-
sures we have chosen, at the obfuscation level of 30%.We
choose 30% because it is a more realistic configuration
in practice. Readers can refer to the appendix for potency
evaluation data at other obfuscation levels, i.e., from 10%
to 50%. To be conservative, by the time of measurement
we have stripped the code belonging to the GNU Prolog
runtime itself, so the extra complexity (if there is any)
should be purely credited to BABEL’s obfuscation. We use
IDA Pro [7], an advanced commercial reverse engineering
tool, to disassemble the binary and generate call graphs and
control-flow graphs. As can be seen, the obfuscated binaries
have a significant advantage on all metrics. The geometric
mean of all six programs shows that BABEL can vastly
increase program complexity. Note that different from static
complexity produced by obfuscation methods using opaque
predicates, the additional control-flow branches injected by
BABEL are “real” in the sense that all branches can be
feasible at run time.
Our potency evaluation is not an ideal methodology for
measuring the same aspect of Code Virtualizer. The reason
is that Code Virtualizer transforms binary instructions into
bytecode and the reverse engineering tool we use, i.e., IDA
Pro, is incapable of handling this situation. Table 3 shows
the complexity of binaries with and without Code Virtualizer
obfuscation, obtained in the same way as Table 2. The data
suggests that after Code Virtualizer is applied, the complex-
ity of the protected binaries has a notable decrease compared
to the original ones. In reality, this is a consequence of the
aforementioned issue. Because IDA Pro is unable to analyze
the re-encoded functions, the potency evaluation inevitably
misses a significant portion of the complexity.
8.2. Resilience
In general, the resilience of an obfuscation technique
is hard to assess because reverse engineering can be a
very ad-hoc process. On the other hand, very few practical
deobfuscation tools are publicly available to the community.
Because of these difficulties, some previous work on soft-
ware obfuscation failed to evaluate resilience properly. In
our evaluation, we choose binary diffing to assess BABEL’s
resilience after intensive investigation, although it does not
mean binary diffing is the only deobfuscation technique.
Binary diffing is a commonly used reverse engineering
technique which calculates the similarity between two bina-
ries. We consider binary diffing a deobfuscation technique
because it reveals the connection from an obfuscated pro-
gram to its original version. Given a program binary and
its obfuscated version, if a binary diffing tool reports high
similarity score for the comparison (ignoring potential false
positives), then in some sense the differ has successfully
undone the obfuscation effect. Most historical work on
deobfuscation known to us uses similarity-based metrics to
evaluate the effectiveness of their techniques [66], [24], [81].
Deciding the similarity of untrusted programs, especially
binaries, has been such an important topic in computer
security that DARPA has initiated the four year, $43 million
Cyber Genome Program to support related research [5].
Binary similarity can be calculated based on either syn-
tax or semantics. The syntax mostly refers to the control
flows of the binary and syntax-based binary diffing usually
takes a graph-theoretic approach which compares the call
graphs of two binaries and further the control flow graphs
of pairs of functions between two binaries, looking for
any graph or subgraph isomorphism. The intuition is, if
two binaries have similar call graphs, the functions located
at corresponding nodes in the call graph isomorphism are
likely to be similar ones; if two functions have similar
control flows, they are likely to implement the same com-
putation logic.
On the other hand, semantics-based binary diffing fo-
cuses more on the observable behavior of the binaries.
There are various ways to describe program behavior, e.g.,
the post- or pre-condition of a given chunk of code and
certain effects the code commits such as system calls. If two
binaries have matched behavior, a semantics-based binary
diffing tool will consider them similar.
In general, syntax-based similarity is less strict than
semantics-based similarity. Relatively, syntax-based differs
tend to report more false positives while semantics-based
differs tend to get more false negatives. To avoid bias as
much as possible in the evaluation, we pick binary differs
of both kinds to test BABEL’s resilience to reverse engi-
neering. We employ CoP [48] and BinDiff [2], of which
CoP is a semantics-based binary differ and BinDiff is syntax
based [32], [71]. To measure BABEL’s resilience to a differ,
we randomly pick 50% functions from each program in
Table 1, obfuscate them with BABEL, and then launch the
differs to calculate the similarity between the original and
obfuscated functions.
8.2.1. Resilience to Semantics-Based Binary Diffing.
CoP, a “semantics-based obfuscation-resilient” binary sim-
ilarity detector [48], is currently one of the state-of-the-art
semantics-based binary diffing tools. The detection algo-
rithm of CoP is founded on the concept of “longest com-
mon subsequence of semantically equivalent basic blocks.”
By constructing symbolic formulas to describe the input-
output relations of basic blocks, CoP checks the semantic
equivalence of two basic blocks with a theorem prover. It
is reported that this new binary diffing technique can defeat
many traditional obfuscation methods. CoP is built upon
several cutting-edge techniques in the field of reverse engi-
neering, including the binary analysis toolkit BAP [17] and
the constraint solver STP [33]. CoP defines the similarity
score as the number of matched basic blocks divided by the
count of all basic blocks in the original function.
Fig. 9 is the box plot showing the distribution of similar-
ity scores. For all programs, the third quartile of the scores
is below 20%. Considering that the original paper of CoP
reports over 70% similarity in most of their tests on trans-
formed or obfuscated programs, the scores calculated from
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Figure 9. Distributions of similarity scores between the original and
BABEL-obfuscated functions in the evaluated programs.
TABLE 4. FUNCTION MATCHING RESULT FROM BINDIFF ON
BABEL-OBFUSCATED PROGRAMS
Program # of Obfuscated # of Matched Match Rate
bzip2 54 6 11.11%
mcf 13 7 53.85%
regexp 11 3 27.27%
svm light 52 10 19.23%
oftpd 48 4 8.33%
mongoose 102 39 38.24%
Overall 280 69 24.64%
BABEL-obfuscated functions are not convincing evidence of
similarity. One may notice that there are a few outliers in
Fig. 9, i.e., the similarity scores for some functions can reach
100%. These functions are all “simple” ones, namely they
have only one basic block and very few lines of C code.
With the presence of false positives, it is very likely that the
binary differ can report 100% similarity for these functions,
according to CoP’s similarity score definition.
8.2.2. Resilience to Syntax-Based Binary Diffing. BinDiff
is a proprietary syntax-based binary diffing tool which is
the de facto industrial standard with wide availability. It has
motivated the creation of several academia-developed binary
differs such as BinHunt [34] and its successor iBinHunt [54].
Given two binaries, BinDiff will give a list of func-
tion pairs that are considered similar based on a set of
different algorithms. In addition to the similarity level like
CoP reports, BinDiff also reports its “confidence” on the
results, based on which algorithm is used to get that score.
It is not completely clear to us how each of BinDiff’s
algorithms works and how BinDiff ranks the confidence
level. Therefore, we report how many obfuscated functions
are correctly matched to their originals by BinDiff regardless
of the similarity score and the confidence. This makes sure
BABEL does not take any unfair advantage over its opponent
in the evaluation of performance. In other words, the results
reported here indicate a lower bound of BABEL’s resilience
to syntax-based binary diffing.
Table 4 shows how many obfuscated functions in each
program are matched (although some of them get low
similarity scores or confidence). Since BinDiff can match
functions solely based on their coordinates in the call graphs,
two functions can be matched even if they have totally
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Figure 10. Distributions of similarity scores between the original and CV-
obfuscated functions in the evaluated programs.
TABLE 5. FUNCTION MATCHING RESULT FROM BINDIFF ON
CV-OBFUSCATED PROGRAMS
Program # of Obfuscated # of Matched Match Rate
bzip2 54 7 12.96%
mcf 13 4 30.77%
regexp 11 0 0.00%
svm light 52 1 1.92%
oftpd 48 2 4.17%
mongoose 102 11 10.78%
Overall 280 25 8.93%
different semantics. This explains why BinDiff can achieve a
relatively high matching rate for mongoose, because mon-
goose has the largest number of functions and potentially
has a more iconic call graph. Nevertheless, only 26.22% of
the obfuscated functions are matched by BinDiff over all six
programs. Note that matching does not yet imply success-
ful deobfuscation or recovery of program logic, especially
for syntax-based binary differs. In that sense, we believe
BABEL’s performance is satisfying.
8.2.3. Comparing BABEL with Code Virtualizer. We
present Code Virtualizer’s resilience to CoP and BinDiff in
Fig. 10 and Table 5, respectively. The data are obtained
in experiments of which the settings are consistent with
the resilience evaluation on BABEL. Based on the data, it
seems that Code Virtualizer is more resilient to CoP and
BinDiff than BABEL. However, as aforementioned in the
potency evaluation, reverse engineering binaries protected
by virtualization-based obfuscators like Code Virtualizer
requires specialized approaches. Since neither CoP nor Bin-
Diff is made aware of the fact that the obfuscated parts
of the binaries have been transformed from code to data,
their poor performance is not a surprising result. After
all, a major weakness of virtualization-based obfuscation is
that although the original program may be well obfuscated,
the virtual machine itself is still exposed to attacks. By
reverse engineering the logic of the virtual machine and
revealing the encoding format of the bytecode, attackers can
effectively deobfuscate the protected binaries [66], [81].
8.3. Cost
We measure execution slowdown introduced by BABEL
from the obfuscation level of 10% to 50%. We use the
test cases shipped with the obfuscated software as the
performance test input for CPU-bound applications. For
FTP server oftpd, we transfer 10 files ranging from 1KB
to 128MB. For HTTP server mongoose, we sequentially
send 100 quests for a 2.5KB HTML page. We conduct the
experiments on a desktop with Xeon E5-1607 3.00GHz CPU
and 4GB memory running 64-bit Ubuntu 12.04 LTS, over a
1Gbps Ethernet link. We run each test 10 times and report
the average slowdown. For servers, time spent on network
communication is included by our measurement.
Unlike potency and resilience, we can easily conduct a
fair comparison between BABEL and Code Virtualizer on
execution overhead. In the comparison, we configure Code
Virtualizer to minimize obfuscation strength and maximize
execution speed. The implication of our comparison setting
is that, if BABEL can achieve comparable or better per-
formance than a mature commercial product, the runtime
overhead introduced by BABEL should be acceptable for
practical use. To show that the functions we obfuscate are
non-trivial, we use gprof to get their performance cover-
age, i.e., the percentage of CPU time taken by the obfuscated
functions in the execution of the original programs. Note that
the percentage we obtain is just a lower bound because some
functions may be inlined and gprof will contribute their
execution time to other functions. We are only able to get the
coverage data for the four CPU-bound applications, because
the CPU time spent by the two original server programs is
too short for meaningful profiling. Profiling server programs
usually requires dedicated profilers and we are unaware of
the existence of such tools for the two server programs we
picked.
Table 6 gives the experiment results, showing that BA-
BEL outperforms Code Virtualizer in most of the cases we
tested. In particular, BABEL’s obfuscation is more reliable
in the sense that the obfuscated programs exit normally and
give correct output on test input, while Code Virtualizer
fails to provide reliable obfuscation on most of the tested
programs when obfuscation level reaches 40%. Both BABEL
and Code Virtualizer impose considerably high performance
overhead after the obfuscation level reaches 30%, for many
of the CPU-bound applications. This is expected, because
in general such heavy-weight obfuscation methods should
be avoided when protecting program hot spots [8]. In the
evaluation, the coverage of many applications exceeds 30%
after the obfuscation level reaches 50%, which is rarely the
case if BABEL and Code Virtualizer are to be deployed in
practice. Regardless, the key point of this evaluation is to
demonstrate that BABEL’s performance cost is lower than an
industry-quality obfuscator which shares certain similarity
with BABEL.
8.4. Stealth
By evaluating stealth we investigate whether BABEL
introduces abnormal statistical characteristics to the obfus-
cated code. In the stealth evaluation, we pick the 30%
obfuscation level.
TABLE 6. TIME OVERHEAD INTRODUCED BY BABEL AND CODE VIRTUALIZER (CV)
Program
10% obfuscated 20% obfuscated 30% obfuscated 40% obfuscated 50% obfuscated
Coverage Slowdown Coverage Slowdown Coverage Slowdown Coverage Slowdown Coverage SlowdownBABEL CV BABEL CV BABEL CV BABEL CV BABEL CV
bzip2 0.00% 1.5 1.9 0.00% 1.5 1.9 27.78% 8.0 × 33.34% 100.9 × 33.34% 105.8 ×
mcf 0.66% 1.0 12.0 4.30% 6.9 52.4 15.54% 65.8 × 69.33% 135.9 × 83.33% 169.3 ×
regexp 18.33% 138.5 660.9 19.74% 173.8 834.8 19.74% 198.7 1122.2 28.91% 285.9 × 28.91% 288.8 ×
svm light 13.33% 1.0 58.0 20.00% 4.0 × 26.67% 4.1 × 26.67% 4.1 × 33.33% 11.8 ×
oftpd - 1.0 1.0 - 1.1 1.1 - 1.1 1.1 - 1.1 × - 1.1 ×
mongoose - 1.0 1.4 - 1.2 8.8 - 1.6 9.3 - 1.7 × - 2.1 ×
Coverage denotes the percentage of CPU time taken by the obfuscated functions in the execution of the original programs (not available for IO-bound servers). The percentage
provided is a lower bound because some functions may be inlined into others. × indicates that the corresponding test failed due to program crash or incorrect output.
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Figure 12. Instruction distributions of SPECint2006 programs (mean and
standard deviation) and CV-obfuscated programs
Some previous work measures obfuscation stealth by
the byte entropy of program binaries [79], for byte entropy
has been used to detect packed and encrypted binaries [49].
Since BABEL does not re-encode original binary code, pos-
sessing normal byte entropy may not be a strong evidence
of stealth. Therefore, we employ another statistical feature,
the distribution of instructions, to evaluate BABEL. This
metric has also been employed by previous work [58], [19].
To tell whether BABEL-obfuscated programs have abnormal
instruction distributions, we need to compare them with
normal programs. Since the scale of programs used in
our evaluation is relatively small, we select the SPEC2006
benchmarks as the representatives of normal programs. We
group common x86 instructions into 27 classes and calculate
the means and standard deviations of percentages for each
group within SPEC2006 programs. Since integer programs
and floating-point programs have different distributions, we
only compare bzip2, mcf, regexp, oftpd, and mongoose with
SPECint2006.
Fig. 11 presents the comparisons for integer programs.
For the majority of instruction groups, their distributions
in BABEL-obfuscated programs fall into the interval of
normal means minus/plus normal standard deviations. There
are some exceptions such as mov, call, ret, cmp, and
xchg. However, their distributions are still bounded by
the minimum and maximum of SPEC distributions (not
shown in the figure). Hence, we believe these exceptions are
not significant enough to conclude that BABEL-obfuscated
programs are abnormal in terms of instruction distribution.
Meanwhile for binaries obfuscated by Code Virtualizer,
the instruction distributions are significantly more deviant,
as shown by Fig. 12. It should be noted that when we tried
to disassemble binaries processed by Code Virtualizer, the
disassembler reports hundreds of decoding errors, presum-
ably because Code Virtualizer transforms legal instructions
to bytecode which cannot be correctly decoded by the disas-
sembler. Nevertheless, this disassembly anomaly itself can
also be strong evidence of obfuscation. Overall, the exper-
iments indicate that BABEL has better stealth performance
than Code Virtualizer.
There may be of a concern that solely the existence
of a Prolog execution environment can be the evidence of
obfuscation. This can be tackled by developing a customized
Prolog engine. Previous work has shown that a Prolog
engine can be implemented with less than 1,000 lines of
Pascal or C code [41], [78].
9. Discussion
9.1. Generalizing Translingual Obfuscation
Although it is usually quite challenging to translate
programs in one language to another language with very
different syntax, semantics, and execution models, many of
the obstacles can be circumvented when the translation is
for obfuscation purposes and not required to be complete.
In our translation from C to Prolog, we designate the
task of supporting C memory model, which is one of the
most challenging issues in translating C, partially to the C
execution environment itself. This solution is not feasible
in general-purpose language translations. Meanwhile, some
of our translation techniques are universally applicable to a
class of target languages that share certain similarities. For
example, the control flow regularization methods we pro-
posed can be adopted when translating C to many declarative
programming languages. We believe that translingual obfus-
cation has the potential to be made a general framework that
supports various source and target languages.
9.2. Multithreading Support
Our current implementation of BABEL does not support
C multithreading, and the main reason is that some compo-
nents of GNU Prolog are not thread safe. Since GNU Prolog
is a Prolog implementation for research and educational
use, some language features are not supported. However,
many other Prolog implementations that are more mature
can indeed support multithreading well [9]. By investing
enough engineering effort, we should be able to improve the
implementation of GNU Prolog and ensure that it supports
concurrent programming. Therefore, we do not view the
current limitation as a fundamental one.
9.3. Randomness
Some obfuscation techniques improve the security
strength by introducing randomness. For example, the
virtualization-based obfuscators usually randomize the en-
coding of their virtual instruction set [31] so that attackers
cannot crack all randomized binaries by learning the en-
coding of a single instance. Although this randomization
is ineffective once attackers learned how to systematically
crack the virtual machine itself, the idea of randomization
does have some value.
Our current design of translingual obfuscation does not
explicitly feature any randomness. However, since translin-
gual obfuscation is orthogonal to existing obfuscation tech-
niques, it can be stacked with those techniques that do in-
troduce randomness. Translingual obfuscation itself has the
potential to feature randomness as well. One promising di-
rection could be making some of the foreign language com-
pilation strategies undeterministic. Previous research [30]
has shown that mutating compilation configurations can
effectively disrupt some deobfuscation tools.
9.4. Defeating Translingual Obfuscation
In general, translingual obfuscation is open design and
does not rely on any secrets, although it can be combined
with other secret-based obfuscation methods. All of our jus-
tification on the security strength of translingual obfuscation
assumes that attackers do possess the knowledge that we
have translated C into Prolog. Indeed, with this knowledge
attackers can choose to convert the binary to Prolog first
rather than directly getting back to C. Either way, attackers
will face severe challenges.
We would like to emphasize again that we do not argue
it is impossible to defeat translingual obfuscation. Instead,
we argue that Prolog is more difficult to crack than C, in
the translingual obfuscation context. As long as a BABEL-
translated Prolog predicate is compiled as native code,
recovering it to a high-level program representation faces
all the difficulties encountered in C reverse engineering,
including the hardness of disassembly and analysis [74].
In §4 we revealed the deep semantics gap between Prolog
source code and its low-level implementation. Thanks to
this gap, we expect that recovering the computation logic of
native code compiled from Prolog-translated C source code
will consume a significant amount of reverse engineering
effort.
What makes defeating translingual obfuscation even
more challenging is that, the obfuscated code is not only
a plain combination of normal Prolog plus normal C but
a tangled mixture of both. The execution of obfuscated
programs will switch back and forth between the two lan-
guage environments and there will be frequent interleaving
of different memory models (see §6). This also imposes
challenges to reverse engineering.
There is another point that grants translingual obfusca-
tion the potential to significantly delay reverse engineering
attacks. As stated in §3.3, translingual obfuscation is not
limited to Prolog. There are many other programming lan-
guages that we can misuse for protection. By mixing these
languages in a single obfuscation procedure, the difficulty
of reverse engineering will be further increased.
10. Related Work
10.1. Programming Language Translation
People seek to translate one programming language to
another, especially from source to source, for portability,
re-engineering, and security purposes. The source-to-source
translation from C/C++ to Java is one of the most exten-
sively explored topics in this field, leading to tools such as
C2J [44], C++2Java [3], and Cappuccino [18], etc. Trudel et
al. [72] developed a converter that translates C to Eiffel, an-
other object-oriented programming language. A tool called
Emscripten can translate LLVM intermediate representation
to JavaScript [82]. Since C/C++/Objective-C source code
can be compiled into LLVM intermediate representation,
Emscripten can also be used as a source-to-source translator
without much additional effort. The C-to-Prolog translation
introduced in this paper is partial since we need to keep the
original C execution environment; however, our translation
is for software obfuscation and being partial is not a limita-
tion. Instead, we show that for our purpose, many technical
issues commonly seen in programming language translation
can be either addressed or circumvented.
10.2. Obfuscation and Deobfuscation
Software obfuscation can be on either source level or
binary level. For source code obfuscation, Sharif et al. [65]
encrypted equality conditions that depend on input data with
some one-way hash functions. The evaluation shows that it
is virtually impossible to reason about the inputs that satisfy
the equality condition with symbolic execution. Moser et
al. [55] demonstrate that opaque predicates can effectively
hide control transfer destination and data locations from
advanced malware detection techniques.
Obfuscation-oriented program transformations can also
be performed at the binary level. Popov et al. [58] ob-
fuscate programs by replacing control transfers with ex-
ceptions, implementing real control transfers in exception
handling code, and inserting redundant junk transfers after
the exceptions. Mimimorphism [79] transforms a malicious
binary into a mimicry benign program, with statistical and
semantic characteristics highly similar to the mimicry target.
As a result, obfuscated malware can successfully evade
statistical anomaly detection. Chen et al. [19] propose a
control-flow obfuscation method making use of Itanium
processors’ architectural support for information flow track-
ing. In detail, they utilize the deferred exception tokens
in Itanium processor registers to implement opaque pred-
icates. Domas [28] developed a compiler which generates a
binary employing only the mov family instructions, based
on the fact that x86 mov is Turing complete. There are
other binary obfuscation methods which heavily relies on
compression, encryption, and virtualization [39], [51], [61].
Among these obfuscation techniques, binary packers using
compression and encryption can be vulnerable to dynamic
analysis because the original code has to be restored at
some point of program execution. As for virtualization-
based obfuscation, most current approaches are implemented
in the decode-dispatch scheme [68]. Recent effort [60],
[66] has identified the characteristics of the decode-dispatch
pattern in the virtualization-obfuscated binaries so that they
can be effectively reverse engineered.
As for deobfuscation, most recent work focuses on at-
tacking virtualization-based obfuscation. Sharif et al. [66]
has developed an outside-in approach which first reverse
engineers the virtual machine and then decodes the bytecode
to recover the protected program. Another deobfuscation
method presented by Coogan et al. [24] chooses the inside-
out method which utilizes equational reasoning to simplify
the execution traces of protected programs. In this way,
the deobfuscator extracts instructions which are truly rel-
evant to program logic. A very recent method proposed
by Yadegari et al. [81] improved the inside-out approach
with more generic control flow simplification algorithms that
can deobfuscate programs protected by nested virtualization.
Without access to these tools, we cannot directly test BA-
BEL’s resilience to them. However, since BABEL completely
reforms C programs’ data layout and reconstructs the control
flows with a much different programming paradigm, we are
very confident with BABEL’s security strength against these
approaches.
Binary diffing is another widely used reverse engineer-
ing technique that takes program obfuscation into account.
Binary differs identify the syntactical or semantic simi-
larity between two different binaries, and can be used to
detect programming plagiarism and launch similarity-based
attacks [16]. BinDiff [2] and CoP [48], the two differs we
use for evaluating BABEL’s resilience, are currently the state
of the art. Other examples of binary differs include Darun-
Grim2 [6], Bdiff [1], BinHunt [34], and iBinHunt [54].
Although these tools can defeat certain types of program
obfuscation, none of them are designed to handle the com-
plexity of translingual obfuscation.
11. Conclusion
In this paper, we present translingual obfuscation, a new
software obfuscation scheme based on translations from
one programming language to another. By utilizing certain
design and implementation features of the target language,
we are able to protect the original program against reverse
engineering. We implement BABEL, a tool that translates
part of a C program into Prolog and utilizes Prolog’s unique
language features to make the program obscure. We evaluate
BABEL with respect to potency, resilience, cost, and stealth
on real-world C programs of different categories. The ex-
perimental results show that translingual obfuscation is an
adequate and practical software protection technique.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we present the program complexity at
obfuscation levels of 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, and 50%, for
both BABEL (Table 7) and Code Virtualizer (Table 8). We
would like to remind readers that for the BABEL potency
data, all values are obtained by IDA Pro [7]. Since BABEL
generates many indirect control flow (see § 4.2 and Fig. 4),
it is hard to evaluate how accurate IDA Pro is. Nevertheless,
in our case the reported values can be interpreted as lower
bounds of the corresponding metrics.
TABLE 7. PROGRAM COMPLEXITY OF BABEL-OBFUSCATED BINARIES AT DIFFERENT OBFUSCATION LEVELS
Program Obfuscation # of Call Graph Edges # of CFG Edges # of Basic Blocks Cyclomatic Number Knot CountLevel Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio
bzip2
0% 353 1.0 5382 1.0 3528 1.0 1856 1.0 3120 1.0
10% 5609 15.9 18539 3.4 15445 4.4 3096 1.7 12488 4.0
20% 5719 16.2 18909 3.5 15788 4.5 3123 1.7 12166 3.9
30% 5964 16.9 19771 3.7 17078 4.8 2695 1.5 12396 4.0
40% 6386 18.1 19630 3.6 17907 5.1 1725 0.9 12027 3.9
50% 6617 18.7 19829 3.7 18210 5.2 1621 0.9 12110 3.9
mcf
No Obf. 78 1.0 854 1.0 583 1.0 273 1.0 153 1.0
10% 5159 66.1 13352 15.6 11759 20.2 1595 5.8 8761 57.3
20% 5302 68.0 13500 15.8 12079 20.7 1423 5.2 8761 57.3
30% 5449 69.9 14233 16.7 13086 22.4 1149 4.2 8792 57.5
40% 5519 70.8 13922 16.3 12926 22.2 998 3.7 8739 57.1
50% 5697 73.0 14076 16.5 13464 23.1 614 2.2 8686 56.8
regexp
No Obf. 72 1.0 855 1.0 591 1.0 266 1.0 1135 1.0
10% 5053 70.2 13082 15.3 11447 19.4 1637 6.2 9675 8.5
20% 5101 70.8 12964 15.2 11428 19.3 1538 5.8 9491 8.4
30% 5276 73.3 13290 15.5 11802 20.0 1490 5.6 9530 8.4
40% 5309 73.7 13064 15.3 11704 19.8 1362 5.1 9405 8.3
50% 5375 74.7 13292 15.5 11940 20.2 1354 5.1 9393 8.3
svm
No Obf. 511 1.0 5375 1.0 3545 1.0 1832 1.0 2972 1.0
10% 5734 11.2 19156 3.6 15777 4.5 3381 1.8 11729 3.9
20% 6343 12.4 19912 3.7 17368 4.9 2546 1.4 11658 3.9
30% 6739 13.2 20752 3.9 18533 5.2 2221 1.2 11521 3.9
40% 7052 13.8 20680 3.8 19049 5.4 1633 0.9 11547 3.9
50% 7661 15.0 21119 3.9 20135 5.7 986 0.5 11552 3.9
oftpd
No Obf. 455 1.0 2035 1.0 1667 1.0 370 1.0 1277 1.0
10% 5541 12.2 14591 7.2 13011 7.8 1582 4.3 9856 7.7
20% 5710 12.5 15110 7.4 13812 8.3 1300 3.5 9923 7.8
30% 5810 12.8 15501 7.6 14422 8.7 1081 2.9 9911 7.8
40% 5853 12.9 15875 7.8 15086 9.0 791 2.1 9858 7.7
50% 6048 13.3 16493 8.1 16108 9.7 387 1.0 9954 7.8
mongoose
No Obf. 1027 1.0 2788 1.0 2086 1.0 704 1.0 493 1.0
10% 6288 6.1 15981 5.7 14262 6.8 1721 2.4 9495 19.3
20% 6525 6.4 16464 5.9 15102 7.2 1364 1.9 9474 19.2
30% 6762 6.6 17115 6.1 16079 7.7 1038 1.5 9491 19.3
40% 6784 6.6 17597 6.3 16924 8.1 675 1.0 9447 19.2
50% 7024 6.8 18470 6.6 18369 8.8 103 0.1 9450 19.2
TABLE 8. PROGRAM COMPLEXITY OF CV-OBFUSCATED BINARIES AT DIFFERENT OBFUSCATION LEVELS
Program Obfuscation # of Call Graph Edges # of CFG Edges # of Basic Blocks Cyclomatic Number Knot CountLevel Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio Value Ratio
bzip2
0% 353 1.0 5382 1.0 3528 1.0 1856 1.0 3120 1.0
10% 424 1.2 4079 0.8 2962 0.8 1119 0.6 645 0.2
20% 385 1.1 3988 0.7 2906 0.8 1084 0.6 630 0.2
30% 261 0.7 3868 0.7 2826 0.8 1044 0.6 713 0.2
40% 248 0.7 3675 0.7 2684 0.8 993 0.5 699 0.2
50% 242 0.7 3652 0.7 2684 0.8 970 0.5 696 0.2
mcf
No Obf. 78 1.0 854 1.0 583 1.0 273 1.0 153 1.0
10% 36 0.5 531 0.6 377 0.6 156 0.6 71 0.5
20% 36 0.5 520 0.6 370 0.6 152 0.6 71 0.5
30% 34 0.4 461 0.5 329 0.6 134 0.5 68 0.4
40% 24 0.3 372 0.4 270 0.5 104 0.4 54 0.4
50% 33 0.4 308 0.4 223 0.4 87 0.3 46 0.3
regexp
No Obf. 72 1.0 855 1.0 591 1.0 266 1.0 1135 1.0
10% 69 1.0 589 0.7 410 0.7 181 0.7 619 0.5
20% 67 0.9 578 0.7 411 0.7 169 0.6 618 0.5
30% 66 0.9 525 0.6 377 0.6 150 0.6 603 0.5
40% 58 0.8 330 0.4 243 0.4 89 0.3 117 0.1
50% 57 0.8 326 0.4 253 0.4 75 0.3 117 0.1
svm
No Obf. 511 1.0 5375 1.0 3545 1.0 1832 1.0 2972 1.0
10% 403 0.8 3612 0.7 2576 0.7 1038 0.6 324 0.1
20% 382 0.7 3431 0.6 2460 0.7 973 0.5 313 0.1
30% 357 0.7 3267 0.6 2358 0.7 911 0.5 302 0.1
40% 337 0.7 3129 0.6 2259 0.6 872 0.5 293 0.1
50% 311 0.6 2971 0.6 2147 0.6 826 0.5 282 0.1
oftpd
No Obf. 455 1.0 2035 1.0 1667 1.0 370 1.0 1277 1.0
10% 444 1.0 1923 0.9 1582 0.9 343 0.9 1097 0.9
20% 411 0.9 1786 0.9 1454 0.9 334 0.9 1065 0.8
30% 390 0.9 1727 0.8 1435 0.9 294 0.8 542 0.4
40% 333 0.7 1500 0.7 1237 0.7 265 0.7 972 0.8
50% 307 0.7 1384 0.7 1158 0.7 228 0.6 944 0.7
mongoose
No Obf. 1027 1.0 2788 1.0 2086 1.0 704 1.0 493 1.0
10% 717 0.7 2489 0.9 1934 0.9 557 0.8 526 1.1
20% 644 0.6 2239 0.8 1786 0.9 455 0.6 462 0.9
30% 585 0.6 2063 0.7 1638 0.8 427 0.6 442 0.9
40% 532 0.5 1954 0.7 1555 0.7 401 0.6 430 0.9
50% 467 0.5 1787 0.6 1424 0.7 365 0.5 400 0.8
